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The ABC's of the Real Business Cycle
Ever since the advent of an industrialized society, one of
the most interesting yet intriguing questions facing economists
is formulating a plausible explanation for the ups and downs qf
the economy.

Throughout time, a wide variety of theories have

been proposed, ranging from the critical role of private
investment of J.B. Clark to the underconsumption approach of
Thomas Halthus.

However, none have been able to withstand the

test of innovation as countless economists are striving each year
to find a breakthrough in business cycle theory.

The business

cycle is a major issue both inside and outside of the political
arena and is worthy of the research it demands today.

As Charles

Plosser notes, "When we think of business cycles, we frequently
think about notions of persistence or serial correlation in
economic aggregates; comovement among economic activities;
leading or lagging variables relative to output; and different
amplitudes or volatilities of various series"

(53).

One strand

of thought growing out of the 1980's fits this definition quite
well in a theoretical sense.

The Real Business Cycle theory

(RBC) has generated a fervor among business cycle analysts and
offers a great deal of hope in unraveling the mystery of defining
what causes a cycle.

Is it a viable explanation for the cycle or

merely a "catch-phrase" theory for 1980's?

This is the question

that is looking for an answer.
Up until the 1930's, the classical economists' reliance on
supply-side effects as the major cause of changes in aggregate
economic activity dominated macroeconomic thinking.

However,

it
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was Keynes’ General Theory in 1936 which swung the pendulum over
to the demand side and provided the impetus for a demand versus
supply side explanation of the business cycle which still exists
today.

Thomas E. Hall details, "His revolution was successful

because for the past fifty plus years the major business cycle
theories have been based on the instability of aggregate demand”
(121).

The major modern demand-side theories

(monetarist,

rational expectations and new Keynesian) have the two important
tenets of a reversion of real GNP to its trend value and the
belief that real wages are countercyclical following changes in
aggregate demand because of incorrect price expectations (Hall
21).

These two points will be re-iterated later, but suffice it

to say that the modern demand-side theories’ inability to explain
the tendency of the real wage to be procyclical or acyclical
following a change in aggregate demand has generated the
skepticism which led to the Real Business Cycle approach.
With the shortcomings of an aggregate demand approach and
the appearance of supply shocks in the 1970’s, economists turned
the clock back to the classical days of stressing aggregate
supply within the business cycle framework with an added twist.
It is the Real Business Cycle theory which holds that it is real,
rather than monetary factors which cause fluctuations in economic
activity.

Exogenous shocks to aggregate supply are the cause of

all cycles and since shocks occur in all economies, cycles are
indeed ’’natural’’ (Sherman 60).

The RBC theory offers a twist to

the classical^ theory in that it has the added feature of
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predicting procyclical real wages.

Like most other neoclassical

theories, the RBC approach is ahistorical in that it suggests
that all economies have cycles on the basis of theory rather than
an extensive empirical survey (Sherman 60).

While a Keynesian

approach to the cycle enjoys this empirical success,

its lack of

what many consider a less than sound theoretical foundation has
led to some skepticism.

This point is highly debateable, thus

meriting a further explanation.
The Keynesian interpretation of macroeconomic phenomenons,
such as the business cycle, show an absence of foundation based
on the choice theoretic framework of microeconomics (Plosser 51).
Two papers, one by Milton Friedman in 1968 and the other by
Robert Lucas in 1976 illustrate this point quite well.
Friedman’s approach engulfed the tradeoff between inflation and
some measure of real output or unemployment, or the Phillip's
Curve in textbook jargon.

Such a tradeoff was a major feature of

the Keynesian system of the 1960’s.

Friedman's argument showed

that basic microeconomic principles placed a premise on the long
run Phillip's curve being vertical.

Thus, sustained inflation

was compatible with any level of real demand of goods.

A major

tenet of Keynesian thinking was shown to be in contrast with
microeconomic principles.
Lucas' contribution to the theoretical foundation question
stressed that expectations about future policy will
systematically influence current decisions and thus alter the
behavioral relations exploited by implementation of the empirical
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analysis (Plosser 52).

Concurrently, expectations cannot be

formulated or specified in arbitrary manner and be consistent
with individual maximazation.
While both works point out theoretical shortcomings in the
Keynesian framework, a more poignant fact arises out of a static
versus dynamic economic state confrontation.

The foundations of

the Keynesian model are static and focus on determining output at
a point in time, treating the capital stock as given.

Dynamic

elements through accelerator mechanisms and price or wage
adjustment equations have been introduced into the model, but
these elements did not arise from any theoretical framework of
maximization but rather from simple behavior rules which either
characterized agents or markets in general (Plosser 52).

Dynamic

adjustment was merely an empirical question as to which
economist’s formulation fit the data best.

Keynesian models also

start out asserting market failures and do not measure up to
Hick’s "idealized state."

Hicks notes, "It is logically

impossible to attribute an important portion of fluctuations to
market failure without an understanding of the sorts of
fluctuations that would be observed in the absence of the
hypothesized market failure"

(52).

Theoretically, this static

and dynamic economic system debate lessens, to a degree, the
Keynesian theory of the business cycle.
I do not profess to claim that this is a complete discussion
of the theoretical shortcomings of the Keynesian model.
Nevertheless, a Keynesian discussion does have some "theoretical
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holes" which has led to alternative explanations of the cycle.
As a new theory, the Real Busines Cycle model has garnered an
enormous amount of attention in a short period of time.
The theoretical foundation behind the Real Business Cycle
theory is relatively straight-forward and best demonstrated by a
simple model.

It is difficult to offer one "true" model which

encompasses the entire RBC approach because it is being revised
to include such factors as to what role does money and aggregate
demand play in the model?

These points will be taken up later,

but I feel it to be in the best interest of the reader to leave
out the aforementioned questions and get to the heart of the RBC
issue by concentrating on how exogenous shocks to aggregate
supply can move through a simple model eloquently illustrated by
Thomas E. Hall.

The model is based on the premise of perfect

competition with no externalities and assumes three things.
First, after new goods are ordered, they take several periods to
build.

Second, following changes in income, households gradually

adjust their consumption patterns over time.

Third, the model

assumes that wages and prices are perfectly flexible which
ensures that all trading takes place in equilibrium (Hall 124).
Exogenous shocks can be the result of demographic changes,
technology shocks, changes in relative input prices or changes in
consumer preferences.

Supply-side effects can best be

illustrated by a Cobb-Douglas production function where real GNP
(Y) is a function of labor input,

(L) capital stock (K) and a

term which picks up shocks to the production function (z).

6
Y = f(L ,K ,Z )
The shock term (Z) can further be illustrated and assumed to
evolve around a constant term (

) and a random error term with

an expected value of zero (e).
z

=

+e

Shocks may occur in the economy which affect the production
function (f) itself such as a major advancement in technology
which allows a given stock of capital and labor to produce more
output for a set price level.

Similarly, shocks may affect the

inputs of labor (L) and capital (K) availability.

The "baby

boom" and changes in the relative price of energy are two prime
examples, respectively.
A major premise of the RBC theory is that the economy is
constantly receiving exogenous shocks to the production function,
whether they be major like a war, or more commonly smaller shocks
to labor, capital and technology which have a positive trend
value (

) and a random component (e).

The positive trend value

denotes that, over time, positive influences on aggregate supply
lead to growth.

The random component ensures that the shocks, on

average, have a neutral rather than a good or bad effect on
economic activity.
One may erroneously conclude from the model and its neutral
error term (e) with an expected value of zero that the various
shocks cancel each other out in succeeding periods.

Upon closer

investigation, shocks can occur consecutively in successive
periods.

For example, if several positive shocks occur, output
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grows more rapidly.
From a testing standpoint, the fact that technology shocks
are unobservable is a drawback. In order to conduct empirical
research as to the effect technological change has, researchers
use Solow residuals.

Going back to our production function and

assuming that factors are paid their marginal products, data on
the total shares of output going to an input can be used to infer
the coefficients of the production function.
coefficients,

Using these

it is possible to deduce what would be the change

in GNP from one year to the next if only the inputs changed.
Then, any difference between the actual change in GNP and the
calculated change must be attributed to changes in technology
(Rush 19).
With a basic introduction to an RBC model, how does the
model explain persistent output changes?

Persistence in the

sense that output will tend to grow more than trend during
expansions for several quarters and less than trend during a
recession.

If, as the model implies, economic fluctuations are

caused by a series of shocks in the same direction or a single
major shock, both should be able to explain persistent output
changes.

According to Hall, "In the case of a series of shocks

in the same direction, we can easily see how this causes
expansionary or contractionary pressure on output for several
periods" (124).

It is with the single exogenous shock where we

can view Hall's model in action.
Hall assumes an economy in a steady state with a long run
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economic growth rate of three percent and no random shocks so
that our e value is zero.

Introducing a single positive shock

such as robot technology which makes production easier, firms
which can benefit from such technology will immediately demand
it.

The producers of such demanded technology will see an

increase in labor needed and because wage rigidities aren't
assumed to exist, both employment and real wages rise (Hall 124).
The time-to-build and smoothed consumption spending implications
of the model lead to the important conclusion that since it will
take several periods to fill new orders, households will continue
to earn higher wages and will spread their increased consumption
pattern from the higher wages over several periods.

With

increased spending by households over time, aggregate output and
employment will grow more than trend for a number of periods.
One can easily see that real wages behave in a procyclical manner
as the technology shock increases the marginal products of both
labor and capital and the subsequent increase in labor demanded
raised both employment and the real wage.

Such a conclusion is a

major tenet of the RBC cause.
Eventually, the effect of the shock works its way through
the economy.

The new technology becomes embedded into the

production pattern and the economy returns to a steady state
equilibrium with a three percent growth rate.

What must be made

evidently clear is that the RBC approach assumes that the three
percent growth rate takes place at a higher base level of output
than before.

Such an assumption puts the theory in direct
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conflict with demand-side theories, a point that will be
expounded upon later.

As one can see, a single exogenous shock

in the form of a technological advance has led to an increase in
real GNP and offers a theoretical proof of the Real Business
Cycle theory.

In no way is this model deemed to be an all-

encompassing entity of the RBC approach.

Other models, most

significantly those of Plosser (1982) and Kyland and Prescott
(1982) are similar in nature and offer only a few expansions on
the model presented here.

While an RBC model may not enjoy the

empirical success that a demand-side model can at the present,
its theoretical foundation is valid and commands further
research.
With a general understanding of what the RBC theory
encompasses,

it is its conflict with modern demand-side theories

of the cycle where we now turn our attention.

Such conflict

keeps business cycle theorists divided as to which theory gives a
truer approximation of the cycle.

The conflict can best be

described most accurately on the two fronts where the RBC
approach differs radically from a demand-side approach.

First is

the argument over real GNP changes, are they real or transitory?
Demand-side models propose that fluctuations in real GNP are only
temporary deviations from the natural rate and, eventually, real
GNP will return to this natural rate.

The RBC model counters

with the belief that output changes are permanent and there is no
reason to believe that real GNP will return to a trend line.
Here we see real GNP following a random walk pattern.

While the
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RBC theory relies very little on empirical proof, the resolution
of the trend-reversion, random walk debate can only be settled
empirically.

Specifically, time series analysis is used and

offers a way of tracking a variable’s (real G N P ) history through
specific equations (Hall 127).

The equation specific to the

demand-side trend reversion model is
InY

= InY

+ gT

where In indicates natural logarithm, Y is real GNP, g is the
trend rate of growth of real GNP, T is time and subscripted t
represents the time period (Hall 127).

Natural logs offer the

handy property that if a variable has a constant growth rate,
then any change in that variable's natural log will also be
constant.

By starting with the natural log of real GNP at any

pre-determined time o and extrapolating the average growth rate
of real GNP (3.2% per year since 1950), we are able to determine
the log of natural real GNP (InY ) in any time period and see how
real GNP grows.

As previously mentioned, this trend-reversion

model postulates that GNP is allowed to stray from the natural
rate in the short run but must revert to the natural rate in the
long run.

An equation which describes this process is
InY

= InY

+ B (InY -InY

) +u

where Y is actual real GNP, B is a coefficient on lagged output
deviations that lies between zero and one, and u is a term with
an expected value of zero (Hall 128).

The value of the InY

merely calculated from the previous equation.

is

It is the B term,

however, which is integral to this whole process.

The trend-
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reversion model claims this value lies between zero and one which
ensures that whenever real GNP is not on the trend line, the
tendency is for output to return to the trend line.

One could

plug a variety of numbers into the two equations and come up with
a number of values of the natural log of real GNP and graph these
values to see growth or contractions.

It is within the B term

where we will see real GNP return to its trend value.
that B is 0.6.

Suppose

If a random shock raises real GNP 60 billion

above trend, the next period that 60 billion will correspond to
the time period t-1 and real GNP in period t will lie .6 * 60 or
36 billion above trend.

The subsequent period will see real GNP

lie .6 * 36 or 21.6 billion above trend.

The point to be taken

here is that eventually this number will reach zero and real GNP
will return to the trend line.
The random walk hypothesis adds a slight twist to the
aforementioned equations.
assumed to be one.

Within this hypothesis, the B term is

If a positive shock hits the economy, the

trend line will shift up by the amount of the shock and will
continue on this path until a negative shock shifts it back down
(Plosser 59).

However, because the B term is assumed to be one,

there is no reason to believe that real GNP will revert back to
the trend line.
If the two models assume different values for B, which one
is correct?

Results using the equation
InY

=

+ BlnY

+ u

have shown that one cannot reject the hypothesis that B equals
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one through empirical testing.

Bennett Me Callum has pointed out

that such results could be taken in the wrong manner as the
random walk hypothesis is true only if B is exactly equal to one.
A B value of .99 would shift proof towards the trend-reversion
model (Klein 45).

According to Thomas E. Hall, "Being unable to

reject the real business cycle claim that B equals one doesn't
necessarily mean that we can reject the trend reversion model
with B slightly less than one.

As a result, the empirical

evidence is not conclusive about whether real GNP follows a
random walk or a trend reversion model because neither claim can
be rejected"

(131).

Turning our attention to an even more volatile issue between
demand and supply discrepancies,

it is the role of money in

influencing output which is receiving the greatest amount of
attention.

A staunch real business cycle theory argues that,

even in the short run, money doesn't influence output.
output growth influences monetary growth.

Instead,

The modern demand-side

theories, in contrast, place a heavy premise on monetary changes
being the major cause of business cycles.

Friedman and

Schwartz's Monetary History of the United States in 1963 fostered
enthusiasm in this belief as they argued that over the period
1867-1960, every economic expansion was accompanied with a rise
in the monetary growth rate and every contraction accompanied by
a lowering of the monetary growth rate (Rush 21).

Such proven

knowledge brought monetarism to the forefront of macroeconomic
thinking and offered a solid explanation of monetary growth and
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the business cycle.

This belief came under fire in the early

1980’s with Sims' vector autoregression model (VAR).

A VAR

specifies each variable in the system as a function of its own
history and lagged values of other variables in the system (Hall
133).

Sims' four equation VAR model included output, money,

prices and interest rates.

Each variable was isolated in a

separate equation with the lagged value of this variable coupled
with the lagged values of the other three being capable of
explaining its current value.

By empirically testing each

equation with collected data values, one can deduce if interest
rates, money or prices are statistically significant enough to
influence output changes.

What Sims concluded was that when

interest rates were included in the output equation,

interest

rates influenced real GNP but money did not.

Other tests

(133).

using vector autoregression models done by Litterman and Weiss in
1985 supported Sims' results (Rush 15).

As in the case of the

trend-reversion versus random walk hypothesis, empirical testing
has been unable to settle once and for all the monetary issue.
Both sides present poignant arguments and have a degree of
empirical proof, yet the debate wages on.
The preceding discussion has dealt with many aspects of the
Real Business Cycle theory.

As a theory worthy of continued

research and discussion, I find it to be a major part of the
economic arena.
cycle analysis,

As an all-encompassing solution to business
it fails on many counts.

It would seem erroneous

to back the original, straight-forward RBC approach.

The
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complete non-recognition of aggregate demand effects and the
neutrality of money damper what is otherwise a revolutionary way
of looking at the business cycle.

In particular, the

incorporation of a government sector into our simple model can
have profound aggregate demand implications.

Recently, Lawrence

Christiano and Martin Eichenbaum have extended the RBC model to
include government purchases of goods and services along with
unemployment within its framework.

Their results show that the

correlation between productivity shocks and output is lowered.
(Rush 18).

By introducing a simple form of aggregate demand, a

major aspect of the RBC model (that of productivity shocks
significantly affecting output) is lowered.

Also, raising

government purchases induces a negative wealth effect which tends
to reduce consumption and raise work effort and output.

As

increased household consumption from a productivity shock fuels
real GNP growth greater than trend in our simple model, the
inclusion of government purchases will tend to negate this
consumption effect.

While the jury is still out on how much of

real GNP growth can be attributed to demand or supply-side
disturbances, the complete exclusion of aggregate demand in favor
of aggregate supply is a bit hasty.
The jury is still out, coincidentally, on the issue of money
neutrality.

The RBC belief that changes in money supply are the

consequence of "reverse causation" that is, fluctuations in money
supply are a response to output fluctuations initiated by
technology shocks is a polar opposite of modern demand-side
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theories (Klein 45).

As previously discussed, one can find

evidence to support both conclusions.

While being someone who is

still a novice in the field of business cycle studies, I
nevertheless find it hard to conform to the belief that money is
completely neutral.

Sims' vector autoregression model has come

under fire by Me Callum in 1986 who argues that the findings are
predictable because he uses data over a period when the Federal
Reserve was targeting interest rates.

By raising the federal

funds rate, the public is coerced into holding less money.

As

the public reduces their quantity of money demanded, the quantity
of money falls and real GNP lowers in the short run.

The

conclusion Me Callum finds is, because of interest rate
targeting, we find a correlation between interest rates and
output when the true relation is between money and output (Hall
134) .
What I see as a probable resolution to the neutrality of the
money issue is a compromise by both sides.

I feel the RBC

approach needs to incorporate the money factor by modifying
standard real cycle models.

Such incorporation need not accept

the monetary influence as a major part of the cycle, but it
should at least recognize the possible influence monetary factors
have.

While the insight provided by the RBC model that broader

money supply measures are endogenous is worthwhile indeed, narrow
measures of money and their effects on economic activity must be
taken into account of.

Finn Kyland in 1989 introduces money into

the model in two ways.

First, he assumes that changes in the
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m o ney supply create c o n f usion about the real wage.

Given this

confusion,

in the money

supply as

people would react to unexpected changes
if they were changes

introduces money as a means
(Rush 21).

In both

in real

factors.

Second,

he

to conserve on tran s a c t i o n costs

instances,

money can play a small

role within

the Real Business Cycle model.
Research

into the Real

infancy today.
has pointed
economic
appeal

However,

Business Cycle theory is still

it has been poignant

out that s u p p l y-side

fluctuations.

of this

Charles

line of research

factors

in the

in its

fact that

also can play a role

I. Plosser points out that,
is the apparent power

equilibrium"

(71).

of some

from preferences,

on analyzing

enhance the RBC framework.

or even m o n e y have been shown to
Time will

only tell

an impact the RBC model will have on business

deny its

influence

only technological

seems to be waning as other shocks arising

g overnment

as a viable alternative

that

incompatible with any notion of

The reliance

or p r o d u c t i v i t y shocks

in

"The

ver y simple economic principles to generate dynamic behavior
was heretofore thought to be

it

on how strong

cycle

to the d e m a n d - s i d e approach,

theory,

of

but

one cannot

in the area of business cycle studies.
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